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TAX ASSESSMENT OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY: 
TAX BREAKS FOR POLLUTERS? 
Bonnie H. Keen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A company owns and operates an industrial facility that is heavily 
contaminated with hazardous substances. 1 Prior to the contamina-
tion, the property was worth $1 million. The state environmental 
agency, however, has ordered the company to spend $2 million to 
clean up the property. Because these cleanup costs far exceed the 
value of the property in an environmentally clean condition, the 
company claims that its property has a zero or negative value for 
tax assessment purposes. Consequently, the company is seeking a 
full reduction in its property taxes . 
• Member, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. The 
author is spending her third year at the University of Michigan Law School. The author would 
like to thank Professor Zygmunt Plater, Harold N. Skelton, Seth I. Davenport, Roger M. 
Groves, David L. Canary, James R. Arnold, Kay S. Slonim, and Professor Patricia D. White 
for their invaluable assistance. 
1 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) defines hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). This Comment addresses 
contamination only from those hazardous substances that pollute the soil, surface water, and 
groundwater. It excludes asbestos contamination even though asbestos is a hazardous sub-
stance under CERCLA. See United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. 
Pa. 1989). Asbestos contamination presents valuation obstacles that are inherently different 
from other hazardous substances. Asbestos is self-contained and limited to improvements on 
property in contrast to soil and groundwater contamination that can spread over a wide area, 
including onto adjacent properties. In addition, the EPA is prohibited from conducting a 
cleanup action in response to a release or threat of release "from products which are part of 
the structure of, and result in exposure within, residential buildings or business or community 
structures." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(B) (1988). Finally, the EPA has authority to regulate 
asbestos contamination in buildings directly under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2641-2656 (1988). 
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This increasingly common scenario presents two problems for local 
taxing authorities.2 The local property tax assessor first must decide 
whether to recognize the effects of environmental contamination on 
property value. In cases where a polluter is involved, the tax asses-
sor must resolve the conflict between environmental policy concerns 
and the valuation principles underlying state property tax laws. 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980 to address the 
risks that contaminated properties pose to public health and the 
environment. 3 Recently, many state legislatures have enacted envi-
ronmental legislation similar to CERCLA.4 The two primary goals 
of these federal and state environmental laws are to ensure that 
contaminated sites are cleaned up, and that those persons involved 
in, or benefiting from, the use of hazardous substances are held liable 
for the cleanup costs. 5 In other words, the polluter or landowner, 
and not the public, should pay for the cleanup. 
2 The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has identified more than 36,000 
properties in the United States that may be contaminated with hazardous substances. Tele-
phone interview with Virgil P. Whitehurst, CERCLIS Helpline (Mar. 9, 1992); see, e.g., 
Comerica Bank-Detroit v. Metamora Township, Nos. 103325, 110482, 112529, slip op. at 2 
(Mich. Tax Trib. Apr. 17, 1989) (taxpayer sought abatement on grounds that its property was 
unmarketable due to contamination); Bielat v. Macomb Township, Nos. 93707, 100295, slip 
op. at 2 (Mich. Tax Trib. Oct. 7, 1987) (taxpayers sought abatements on the grounds that 
their properties were worthless due to contamination); Community Consultants, Inc. v. Bed-
ford Township, No. 86388, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Tax Trib. July 3, 1985) (taxpayer sought 
abatement by claiming that property had negative value because contamination prevented its 
use for any purpose); Appeal of Great Lakes Container Corp., 126 N.H. 167, 168, 489 A.2d 
134, 135 (1985) (taxpayer claimed property unsaleable and thus untaxable due to contamination 
and pending lawsuit regarding liability for contamination); Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of 
Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593,599,549 A.2d 38, 40 (1988) (taxpayer argued for abatement on ground 
that property had no value because it was unmarketable or, in alternative, that dollar-for-
dollar reduction was required for cleanup costs); Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 
36278-36280, slip op. at 5-6 (Wash. B.T.A. July 12, 1990) (taxpayer sought abatement by 
claiming that its property had zero or negative value because costs of cleanup exceeded market 
value of property clean); Fjetland v. Brown, No. 37533, slip op. at 3, 6 (Wash. B.T.A. June 
5, 1990) (taxpayer sought abatement by arguing that its property was unmarketable because 
costs of cleanup exceeded price purchaser would pay for it in uncontaminated condition). 
8 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939b (1988). 
• See, e.g., Hazardous Waste Control Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25245 
(West 1984 & Supp. 1991); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 299.610-299.618 (West 1984 & Supp. 
1991); New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to -
23.24 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT: §§ 465.200-465.420 (1989); Washington 
Model Toxics Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105D.010-70.105D.921 (West Supp. 
1991). 
6 Fjetland v. Brown, No. 37533, slip op. at 4 (Wash. B.T.A. June 5, 1990). 
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Not surprisingly, these environmental laws significantly affect the 
value and use of contaminated property. 6 The costs and uncertainties 
associated with owning contaminated property can be substantial. 7 
For example, the average cleanup cost of a site on the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) National Priority List 
(NPL) is about $40 million. 8 In addition to cleanup costs, an owner 
of contaminated property may be liable under common law both for 
damage to surrounding properties and for personal injuries resulting 
from exposure to the hazardous substances.9 
To reflect the costs of environmental liability, potential buyers of 
contaminated property may pay a lower price than they would for a 
similar property that is "clean". They may require sellers to assume 
the risk of liability through either a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the 
sales pricelO or an indemnification by the sellers for the cost of 
cleanup.11 Many potential buyers, concerned about the possible 
cleanup costs and liability associated with owning contaminated 
property, are unwilling to purchase a contaminated property at any 
price. 12 Moreover, potential buyers may lower their offering price or 
refuse to purchase a property regardless of whether the seller is the 
polluter or not. 
Even though state tax laws require local taxing authorities to 
assess all real property according to the same standard of value, 13 
some local taxing authorities have refused to reduce tax assessments 
of contaminated properties that polluters own. 14 They argue that 
such a reduction is contrary to the policies underlying environmental 
protection legislation. 15 These taxing authorities choose to ignore the 
6 SeePeterJ. Patchin, Valuation of Contaminated Properties, 56 ApPRAISALJ. 7, 7(1988). 
7 See infra notes 59-137 and accompanying text. 
8 Paying for the Past, ECONOMIST, Feb. 29-Mar. 6, 1992, at 80. 
9 See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. 
11 See, e.g., Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 7, 
9 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990) (using the income capitalization approach, taxpayer's 
appraiser valued property assuming that taxpayer provided indemnity and, in the alternative, 
that property was worthless without indemnity), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 N.E.2d 959 (1991); 
Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278--36280, slip op. at 5 (Wash. B.T.A. July 12, 
1990) (taxpayer's appraiser stated potential purchasers would either reduce purchase price by 
their potential liability for cleanup costs or require indemnity from seller for costs associated 
with contamination). 
12 Patchin, supra note 6, at 9. 
13 See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 142--55 and accompanying text. 
15 [d.; see, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 
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effects of contamination on property owned by polluters rather than 
transfer some of the financial burdens of cleanup to the public by 
reducing the tax base. 16 
Despite compelling environmental policy concerns, state courts 
and administrative tax boards across the country have refused to 
allow assessors to depart from their states' uniformity requirement. 17 
Moreover, these courts and tax boards have recognized that the 
liabilities environmental legislation imposes reduce property value. 18 
One court went as far as to state that "it seems beyond dispute that 
designation of property as having a problem serious enough to war-
rant EPA and Superfund cleanup will mark that property as an 
unmarketable pariah for years to come."19 
The second and more difficult problem for assessors is determining 
the extent to which contamination affects property value. Assessors, 
however, cannot look to case law for guidance because the case law 
to date has not formulated a consistent methodology for measuring 
the impact of contamination on property assessments.20 In response 
to this uncertainty, an administrative body in one state, the Oregon 
Department of Revenue (DOR), enacted its own administrative rule 
establishing a methodology for the valuation of contaminated prop-
erty for property tax purposes. 21 The Oregon rule provides assessors 
as well as taxpayers with a comprehensive and equitable solution to 
the unique problem of valuing contaminated property. 
This Comment examines both the substantive and procedural ob-
stacles that contribute to the uncertainties involved in tax assess-
ment of contaminated properties. Section II of this Comment dis-
cusses the three common approaches to property valuation that form 
the basis for property tax assessment. Section III examines the 
factors affecting the valuation of contaminated property, including 
the costs and uncertainties associated with owning contaminated 
property. In section IV, this Comment describes the approaches to 
valuing contaminated property that taxpayers, local taxing author-
382, 390-91, 272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of 
Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 600-01, 549 A.2d 38, 41 (1988). 
16 See Firestone, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 750; Reliable Elec. Finishing 
Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 14-15 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990), 
aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 N.E.2d 959 (1991). 
17 See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. 
18 See, e.g., Inmar, 112 N.J. at 600, 549 A.2d at 41; Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, 
Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 12 (Wash. B.T.A. July 12, 1990). 
19 SCA Servs. v. Thomas, 634 F. Supp. 1355, 1364 (N.D. Ind. 1986). 
00 See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 232-49 and accompanying text. 
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ities, courts, and the Oregon DOR currently use. Section V then 
explores the deficiencies in these approaches and proposes a rule 
that will provide for uniformity in the valuation of contaminated 
property. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT 
Most states, in either their constitution or statutes, have some 
provision for uniform ad valorem property taxes. 22 These uniformity 
provisions require that, for the purpose of property tax assessment, 
the value of property be measured as a specified percentage of the 
property's fair market value.23 Fair market value typically is defined 
as the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in an arm's-
length transaction, when neither party is under duress and both 
parties have knowledge of relevant facts. 24 
The fair market value of property is based on a property's highest 
and best use. The highest and best use of a property is the most 
profitable, probable, and legal use of that property.25 Traditionally, 
government restrictions on use change a property's highest and best 
use and thus affect its fair market value by decreasing the property's 
utility.26 As a result, many state statutes require that market value 
reflect such governmental restrictions on property.27 Both assessors 
and appraisers use three methods to determine the market value of 
property: the "sales comparison" approach, the "cost" approach, and 
22 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ApPRAISERS, AD VALOREM ApPRAISERS: THE NEW PROFES-
SIONALS 5 (1975); see Daniel C. Stockford, Comment, Property Tax Assessment of Conser-
vation Easements, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 823, 839-40 (1990). 
23 Joan M. Youngman, Defining and Valuing the Base of the Property Tax, 58 WASH. L. 
REV. 713, 715 (1983); see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art XIII, § l(a) (fair market value); MICH. CONST. 
art. IX, § 3 (true cash value); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-227 (1980 & Supp. 1988) (full cash 
value); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 38 (West 1978) (fair cash value); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 54:4-2.25 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990) (true value); OR. REV. STAT. § 308.232 (1987) (true cash 
value); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.40.030 (West 1991) (true and fair value). 
24 See Stockford, supra note 22, at 827. 
25 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 
42 (9th ed. 1987) (hereinafter ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE]. 
26 See id. at 40-42. Governmental restrictions include zoning laws, building codes, rent 
control laws, and health codes. ld. at 40. 
'l:1 See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (assessors must 
consider effect of enforceable use restrictions on property value); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.27(1) 
(Callaghan 1984 & Supp. 1990) (assessors must consider advantages and disadvantages of 
location, quality of soil, zoning, and existing use); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.40.030 (West 
1991) (assessors must consider political restrictions such as zoning as well as physical and 
environmental influences). 
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the "income capitalization" approach.28 Assessors typically use all 
three methods in valuation process. 29 
The sales comparison approach30 involves comparing recent sales 
of similar properties in the same or a similar market to a subject 
property.31 Assessors make adjustments to the sale price of each 
comparable property to account for differences in rights conveyed, 
financing terms, and physical characteristics. 32 The sales comparison 
approach is appropriate when the subject property is of a type often 
sold, such as single-family residential property.33 Courts consider 
this approach the most reliable for determining market value because 
it is based on actual market data. 34 
Under the cost approach, assessors add an estimated value of land 
derived from the sales comparison approach to the current value of 
any improvements on the land. 35 To determine the current value of 
the improvements, an assessor reduces the cost of reproducing36 or 
replacing37 the improvements by the amount of depreciation in those 
improvements.38 Accrued depreciation results from physical deteri-
oration, functional obsolescence, and economic obsolescence.39 The 
cost approach is the most reliable means of valuing "special purpose" 
property or other types of property that are not traded frequently 
in the marketplace. 40 Assessors often use the cost approach as a 
28 See ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 70. 
29 Id.; Stockford, supra note 22, at 829. 
30 The "sales comparison" approach also is referred to as the "market data" approach. 
31 See Stockford, supra note 22, at 828. 
32 ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 70-71. 
33 Id. at 313; JACQUES B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 202 (1982). 
34 GELIN & MILLER, supra note 33, at 198-99 & n.4. 
35 ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 71. 
36 "Reproduction cost is the estimated cost to construct, at current prices, an exact duplicate 
or replica of the building being appraised, using the same materials, construction standards, 
design, layout, and quality of workmanship, and embodying all the deficiencies, super ade-
quacies, and obsolescence of the subject building." ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 
25, at 351. 
37 "Replacement cost is the estimated cost to construct, at current prices, a building being 
with utility equivalent to the building appraised, using modern materials and current stan-
dards, design, and layout." Id. at 352. 
38 Id. at 71. 
39 "Functional obsolescence is caused by internal property characteristics such as a poor 
floor plan, inadequate mechanical equipment, or functional inadequacy," whereas economic or 
external obsolescence "is caused by conditions outside the property such as a lack of economic 
demand, changing property uses in the area, or national economic conditions." Id. at 353. 
40 GELIN & MILLER, supra note 33, at 202. Special purpose properties are limited-market 
properties such as churches, schools, and museums. ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 
25, at 21. 
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check against sales comparison and income capitalization values. 
Based on the assumption that a prudent buyer will not pay more for 
a property than it would cost to reproduce the improvements on a 
similar site,41 the cost approach generally establishes the upper limit 
of a property's value. 42 
Under the income capitalization approach, property value is based 
on the present value of the future benefits generated from a prop-
erty.43 To determine a property's present value, an assessor applies 
a capitalization rate44 to the property's income stream and its resale 
or reversion value.45 The capitalization rate is derived from current 
rates of return for similar properties.46 The income capitalization 
approach, most often used to value income-producing property such 
as offices and apartment buildings,47 is similar to the sales compari-
son approach because it too requires extensive market data. 48 
Once an assessor has derived value indications from each ap-
proach, the assessor reconciles these values into a single market 
value estimate.49 To reconcile the values, the assessor does not av-
erage the three values but rather determines which of the ap-
proaches is the most reliable and relevant to the assessed property. 50 
An assessor may find, however, that the three traditional valuation 
methods do not apply to contaminated property. A major obstacle 
to valuing contaminated property is that there is very little market 
data. 51 The explanation for this lack of market data is based on the 
principle of "substitution", according to which a buyer will not pur-
chase a contaminated property when a similar uncontaminated prop-
erty is available. 52 Assessors have difficulty using the three ap-
proaches because each relies, to some extent, on market data. 53 
Moreover, the cost approach may not be useful in the valuation of 
41 ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 346. 
42 See GELIN & MILLER, supra note 33, at 216. 
43 ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 7l. 
44 A capitalization rate is any rate that converts a property's income into present value. 
Id. at 413. 
45 Id. at 7l. 
46 Id. at 72. 
47 See GELIN & MILLER, supra note 33, at 202. 
48 See ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 72. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.; DOUGLAS E. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS PROPERTY REVALUATION 35 (1983) 
[hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS PROPERTY REVALUATION]. 
51 Joseph A. Campanella, Valuing Partial Losses in Contamination Cases, 52 ApPRAISAL 
J. 301, 302 (1984); Patchin, supra note 6, at 9. 
52 ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 35--36; Patchin, supra note 6, at 9. 
53 See supra notes 23--50 and accompanying text. 
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contaminated property where contamination is located in the soil or 
groundwater, because this approach focuses on the valuation of build-
ings and other improvements on property.64 Finally, contamination 
may limit the usefulness of the income approach in situations where 
the contamination is so severe that a property has no present use. 55 
An owner of contaminated property may hire an appraiser to 
conduct a valuation in order to determine whether the tax assess-
ment on the property is accurate. If a taxpayer's property is over-
valued, the taxpayer will pay more than its fair share of taxes. To 
obtain a reduction in its assessment, the taxpayer must appeal the 
assessment to the appropriate taxing authority and prove that the 
assessor's value is erroneous; thus, the taxpayer bears the burden 
of proving overassessment. 56 If a taxpayer fails to meet the burden 
of proof, a court or tax board affirms the assessor's value. 57 Courts 
and administrative tax boards often find that owners of contaminated 
property have provided insufficient proof. 58 
III. FACTORS AFFECTING THE VALUATION OF CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 
A. Costs Associated with Contamination that Affects Property 
Value 
The presence of hazardous substances on real property can have 
a significant impact on the property's value. 59 Either the contami-
nation itself or the costs of complying with environmental laws may 
54 See Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 608, 549 A.2d 38, 45 (1988). 
55 See Fjetland v. Brown, No. 37533, slip op. 7-8 (Wash. B.T.A. June 5, 1990). 
56 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.650(37) (Callaghan 1984 & Supp. 1990) (taxpayer has burden 
of proving true cash value of property); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.40.0301(1) (West 1991) 
(taxpayer must overcome presumption that determination of assessor is correct); Reliable 
Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 16 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. 
Aug. 9, 1990) (taxpayers have burden of proving their right as matter of law to tax abatement), 
afl'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 N.E.2d 959 (1991); Appeal of Great Lakes Container Corp., 126 
N.H. 167, 169, 489 A.2d 134, 136 (1985) ("plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the assessment placed on its property was disproportionately higher in relation 
to its true value than as to other property in general in the taxing district") (quoting Wise 
Shoe Co. v. Town of Exeter, 119 N.H. 700, 701, 406 A.2d 720, 722 (1979». See generally 
Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 7 N.J. Tax 482 (1985) (taxpayer must overcome 
presumption that judgment of County Board of Taxation was correct, and then prove true 
value by preponderance of evidence), aff'd, 214 N.J. Super. 256, 518 A.2d 1110 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, in part, and rev'd, in part, 112 N.J. 593, 549 A.2d 38 (1988). 
57 Roger M. Groves, Do America's State Cases Answer the Question: How Should You 
Value Contaminated Properties? (Sorry), 2 J. PRoP. TAX MGMT. 1, 5 (1991). 
58 See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
69 Patchin, supra note 6, at 7. 
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cause the value of the contaminated site to decrease. Costs associ-
ated with contaminated property include the cost of cleanup and 
liability to third parties as well as the costs resulting from limitations 
upon the use and transferability of the property, increased financing 
or insurance expenses, and market stigma. Assessors should con-
sider the impact of each of these costs in their assessments of con-
taminated property. 
Liability for the cost of cleaning up property in order to comply 
with environmental laws may be the most substantial cost facing an 
owner of contaminated property. 60 Under CERCLA, the owner may 
be liable for all removal61 or remedial costs62 that a federal or state 
agency incurs.63 The owner also may be liable for any necessary 
response costs that private parties incur as a result of the release 
or threatened release of a hazardous substance on the owner's prop-
erty.64 As an alternative to conducting a cleanup itself, the EPA may 
order owners to perform the necessary cleanup. 65 These owners must 
pay for any procedures required to abate the danger or threat to 
public health or the environment, such as removal, containment, or 
treatment of the hazardous substances at the site.66 Moreover, they 
may have to absorb administrative costs, monitoring costs, legal 
fees, engineering fees, and the costs of environmental audits, surety 
bonds, and special insurance. 67 
In addition to paying for cleanup costs, owners of contaminated 
properties may be subject to third-party suits for property damage 
and personal injuries. 68 An owner's exposure to this type of liability 
may depend on whether there is pUblicity regarding the contami-
00 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
61 Section 9601(23) defines removal actions as temporary measures taken to abate a release 
or threat of release of hazardous substances, including security fencing and provision of 
alternative water supplies. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988). 
62 Section 9601(24) defines remedial actions as any permanent measures taken, including 
storage, confinement, excavations, and onsite treatment. Id. § 9601(24). Section 9601(25) 
defines response costs to include costs of removal and remedial actions as well as enforcement 
costs. Id. § 9601(25). 
63 Id. § 9607(a)(I), (a)(4)(A); see Note, Liabilities of the Innocent Current Owner of Toxic 
Property Under CERCLA, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 403,414 (1989). Additionally, an owner of 
contaminated property also may be liable for damages to natural resources and for any health 
assessments or health effects studies. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(C)-(D) (1988). 
64 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). 
65 Id. § 9606(a). Of course, an owner may choose to cleanup its property voluntarily in 
order to avoid such a lawsuit. 
66 See, e.g., id. § 9601(24); OR. ADMIN. R. 150-30B.205-(E)(I)(c) (1990). 
fIT See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988); OR. ADMIN. R. 150-30B.205-(E)(I)(c) (1990). 
68 Patchin, supra note 6, at 12; Melvyn Kopsteill, Property Devaluation & a Question of 
Degree, EXPERTS-AT-LAW, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 9-10. 
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nation at a site. 69 Liability for property damage occurs when haz-
ardous substances spread to the soil and groundwater of neighboring 
properties. 70 Similarly, an owner of contaminated property may be 
liable for personal injuries in a toxic tort action because hazardous 
substances can adversely affect public health. 71 Although CERCLA 
does not permit a cause of action for either property damage or 
personal injury claims,72 a private party can sue for damages under 
state common law theories, including trespass, nuisance, negligence, 
and strict liability.73 Awards in property damage and toxic tort cases 
may exceed cleanup costS. 74 In sum, the market value of contami-
nated property will decrease as a result of the substantial cost and 
uncertainty of future liability for toxic tort and property damage 
claims. 75 
Owners of contaminated property may incur additional costs if 
either the nature and extent of the contamination or governmentally 
imposed restrictions related to the contamination limit the use of 
their property.76 The presence of contamination can alter the highest 
and best use of a property.77 For example, a site that had been an 
industrial park may be usable only as an open storage facility after 
the current owners discover hazardous wastes there. 78 This type of 
change in use necessarily would decrease a property's market value. 
If there is a sufficient threat of danger to public health or the 
environment, an environmental agency may limit access to a contam-
inated site until it is cleaned Up.79 For instance, in City of Newark 
v. Block 1183,80 the Superior Court of New Jersey issued an order 
that gave the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
69 Patchin, supra note 6, at 12. 
70 Id.; Kopstein, supra note 68, at 9-10. 
71 Kopstein, supra note 68, at 10. 
72 Note, supra note 63, at 414. 
73 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 308 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) 
(class action seeking damages under all four theories for injuries arising from contaminated 
water supply), aff'd, in part, and rev'd, in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988). 
74 For example, in the Love Canal case, plaintiffs filed over $3 billion in claims for personal 
injuries in contrast to $30 million in cleanup costs. Katherine T. Eubank, Paying the Costs of 
Hazardous Waste Pollution: Why Is the Insurance Industry Raising Such a Stink?, 1991 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 713 n.3; see Kopstein, supra note 68, at 10 (there may be multimillion-dollar 
toxic tort suits when public discovers that site is contaminated). 
75 Patchin, supra note 6, at 12. 
76 See OR. ADMIN. R. 150-308.205-(E)(3)(a)(A) (1990). 
77 Patchin, supra note 6, at 15. 
78 Id. 
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
80 223 N.J. Super. 10, 537 A.2d 1311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
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(DEP) exclusive possession and control of a warehouse for the pur-
pose of cleaning up a toxic Spill.81 The DEP prohibited the owner of 
the warehouse from using the warehouse for almost three years. 
During that time, the owner incurred substantial costs, losing rental 
income while still paying necessary expenses, such as property 
taxes. 82 
Several states have passed laws that specifically place restrictions 
on the transfer and use of contaminated properties.83 These laws 
generally prohibit any sale, closure, or new use of a contaminated 
site prior to cleanup of the property. For example, the New Jersey 
Environmental Cleanup Responsibilities Act (ECRA)84 requires 
owners and operators of "industrial establishments"85 in New Jersey 
to secure either a "negative declaration", which is a certification 
from the DEP that the facility is clean,86 or DEP approval of a 
cleanup plan by the date of any change in use or ownership.87 If an 
owner fails to comply with ECRA, the DEP can impose several 
penalties, including voiding the facility's sale or transfer. 88 
Whether ECRA-like statutes diminish property values is open to 
dispute.89 On one hand, an assessor may argue that a hypothetical 
buyer will not incur cleanup costs because the current owner cannot 
sell the property while it is contaminated; therefore, according to 
this argument, no deduction is necessary to reflect cleanup costs. 90 
On the other hand, transfer restrictions are similar to other govern-
mental restrictions that assessors take into account as factors re-
81 [d. at 11-12, 537 A.2d at 1312. 
82 [d. at 12, 537 A.2d at 1312; see also Appeal of Great Lakes Container Corp., 126 N.H. 
167, 168, 489 A.2d 134, 135 (1985). 
83 E.g., Hazardous Waste Control Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25232 (West 1984); 
Transfer Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(a) (Supp. 1990); Environmental Cleanup Respon-
sibility Act (ECRA), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1k-6 to -14 (West Supp. 1990). 
84 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1k-6 to -14 (West Supp. 1990). 
85 Section 13:1k-8(f) defines industrial establishment to include any place of business en-
gaged in operations which involve the generation, manufacture, refining, transportation, 
treatment, storage, handling, or disposal of hazardous substances. 
86 [d. § 13:1k-8(g). 
87 [d. § 13: 1k-9a to -9b. 
88 [d. § 13:1k-13a to -13b. 
89 The two cases that have addressed the impact of ECRA-like statutes have done so only 
in dicta. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 395, 272 
Cal. Rptr. 745, 753 (1990) (Department of Health and Safety's restriction did not apply on 
lien date because department had not identified presence of contamination until later); Inmar 
Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 214 N.J. Super. 256, 261-62,518 A.2d 1110,1116 (N.J. Super 
Ct. App. Div. 1986) (ECRA was not operative until after lien dates in question), aff'd, in 
part, and rev'd, in part, 112 N.J. 593, 549 A.2d 38 (1988). 
90 See, e.g., Firestone, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 750. 
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ducing a property's value.91 While the courts have not decided the 
question of whether transfer statutes increase or decrease property 
values,92 Oregon's administrative rule treats governmental restric-
tions on transfer as an adjustment that assessors must consider when 
they utilize the sales comparison approach. 93 
Depending on the nature and extent of the contamination, the 
ability of a current owner or potential buyer to obtain financing, 
either for the sale or the future development of a property, may be 
severely limited. Lenders are reluctant to advance funds to owners 
of contaminated properties because courts may hold these lenders 
liable for cleanup costs. 94 In fact, lenders may have to pay for cleanup 
costs even if those costs exceed the amount of their foreclosed loan. 95 
Moreover, courts have not settled on a standard for determining 
when to extend liability to lenders that would allow lenders to min-
imize their risk. 96 
While a limited number of lenders may be willing to make a loan 
on mildly contaminated property, virtually none do so on severely 
contaminated property.97 Those lenders willing to loan generally 
charge a higher interest rate on contaminated property than on 
uncontaminated property to compensate for their increased risk of 
liability for cleanup costS. 98 A higher interest rate, of course, in-
creases the financing cost to the potential buyer. Both the reduced 
availability of financing and the increased costs of financing diminish 
the market value of the property. 99 
91 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
!rz See infra note 274; see Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, 
slip op. at 20 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990) (board suggested that owner's compliance 
with environmental statutes may increase property's market value), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 
N.E.2d 959 (1991). 
93 OR. ADMIN. R. 150-308.205-(E) (1990). 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.) (court 
held lender would be liable as owner if it had capacity to influence debtor's disposal of hazardous 
wastes), reh'g denied, 911 F.2d 742 (11th Cir. 1990) (en bane), em. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 
(1991). 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 
1986) (court held bank liable for cleanup costs of $551;731 where loan totalled $335,000); see 
also Patchin, supra note 6, at 8. 
96 See Note, Cleaning Up the Debris After Fleet Factors: Lender Liability and CERCLA's 
Security Interest Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (1991). 
ff1 See Patchin, supra note 6, at 11. 
98 Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 14-15 (Wash. B.T.A. 
July 12, 1990). 
99 Id. at 15 (citing INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AsSESSING OFFICERS, PROPERTY 
AsSESSMENT VALUATION 198-202 (1977». 
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Similarly, an owner of contaminated property may not be able to 
obtain insurance coverage for environmental pollution. loo While 
many insurers currently refuse to provide such insurance, some 
provide it at extremely high premiums. 10l The availability of insur-
ance has decreased because insurers cannot predict the timing or 
the extent of damages from contamination. 102 Potential buyers know 
that without insurance coverage they might have to bear the full 
costs of contamination, and therefore accordingly reduce their offer-
ing price. 103 
Beyond tangible costs, a "market stigma" may attach to a contam-
inated property and cause a loss in its market value. 104 Market stigma 
has several causes, including unknown cleanup costs, potential lia-
bility to the public, and financing problems. 105 As a result of market 
stigma, potential purchasers may be reluctant to buy a property that 
once was contaminated even if a federal or state environmental 
agency is satisfied with the cleanup. 106 Consequently, the Washington 
Board of Tax Assessors has recognized the negative impact that 
stigma can have on property value. 107 No other administrative tax 
board or court, however, has taken this position toward market 
stigma. 
To the extent that assessors can estimate the impact of the costs 
of contamination, they should reduce their assessments accordingly. 
Unfortunately, assessors may have great difficulty accurately mea-
suring the impact of these costs on property value. 
B. Uncertainties Associated with Ownership of Contaminated 
Property 
Assessors should adjust the value of contaminated property to 
account for the risks associated with owning contaminated prop-
100 Eubank, supra note 74, at 174 n.lO. 
101 [d. at 174. 
102 [d. at 197-98. 
103 Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 3627~6280, slip op. at 14 (Wash. B.T.A. 
July 12, 1990). 
104 Patchin, supra note 6, at 12-13. See generally Peter J. Patchin, Contaminated Prop-
erties-Stigma Revisited, 59 APPRAISAL J. 167 (1990). 
106 Patchin, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
106 [d. at 12. 
1M See Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 3627~6280, slip op. at 21 (Wash. B. T.A. 
July 12, 1990) (board increased capitaJization rate to reflect effect of stigma on property's 
future marketability); Fjetland v. Brown, No. 37533, slip op. at 8 (Wash. B. T.A. June 5, 1990) 
(board increased discount rate in response to additional risk that stigma would remain with 
property). 
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erty.108 Ownership of contaminated property is risky in light of the 
numerous uncertainties regarding the ultimate cost of cleanup and 
who is responsible for that cost.109 Although assessors should at-
tempt to account for these uncertainties, they may not be able to 
quantify the effect that contamination has on property value with 
any degree of precision. 
Cleanup costs may be difficult to estimate at the time of assess-
ment for tax purposes because the extent of contamination, the level 
of cleanup required, and the appropriate method of cleanup may not 
be known. The primary problem is determining whether a particular 
site is so contaminated that the controlling federal or state environ-
mental statute requires its cleanup. Even when a property has been 
placed on a federal or state list of contaminated sites, the degree of 
contamination on the property may be unknown. For example, the 
EPA may place a site on the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Inventory System (CERCLIS) 
list even though the agency only suspects that the site is contami-
nated by hazardous wastes. 110 Therefore, the only way to determine 
if a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance threatens 
either public health or the environment is for a government agency 
or private party to conduct an environmental assessment. 111 
Once the presence of contamination on a property is confirmed, 
the degree of cleanup necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate 
harm to public health or the environment may remain uncertain. 
While government agencies and property owners want the property 
cleaned up, the two parties address the issue of "how clean is clean?" 
from different perspectives. 112 Property owners want their property 
declared clean so they can use or sell it. 113 On the other hand, 
environmental legislation requires that cleanup actions achieve a 
level of residual contamination that does not pose a threat to public 
health or the environment. 114 In light of this legislative mandate, 
108 See Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 13, 19. 
109 There also may be uncertainty about the potential liability to third parties and the effect 
of post-cleanup stigma. See supra notes 68-75, 104-07 and accompanying text. 
110 Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 3 n.l (Wash. B.T.A. July 12, 1990). 
CERCLIS is the EPA's data base containing the official inventory of CERCLA sites that the 
Superfund program has addressed or needs to address. 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (1990). Placement 
on such a list, nevertheless, may have a significant effect on property value. 
111 Kopstein, supra note 68, at 9. 
112 See Patchin, supra note 104, at 171. 
113 See id. 
114 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(I) (1988). Section 9621 sets forth cleanup standards for both 
governmental and private remedial actions. [d. § 9621(a)-(d). 
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environmental agencies are reluctant to declare that a site is suffi-
ciently clean. 115 Owners therefore usually have to perform environ-
mental assessments that demonstrate that their cleanups have 
abated the danger at their sites. 
A further problem is that the degree of cleanup required may be 
ambiguous when more than one governmental standard applies to a 
site. 116 For example, if a gasoline spill threatens a drinking water 
supply, the EPA's drinking water standard of five parts per billion 
applies. 117 If, however, skin contact is a risk, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) standard, which allows 1,000 
parts per billion, applies. 118 In this case, cleanup costs will be sig-
nificantly greater with the EPA standard than with the OSHA stan-
dard. 119 
To add to the uncertainty, environmental agencies have the dis-
cretion to require additional cleanup actions in the future. 12o An 
agency may determine that further cleanup measures are necessary 
because the agency has issued new regulations imposing more strin-
gent environmental standards or has discovered more contamination 
at a site. 121 Cleanup standards may become more stringent if tech-
nology advances to a level such that environmental experts could 
identify risks to public health at lower concentrations of hazardous 
substances, or if new scientific data on the effects of hazardous 
substances become available. 
Even when an environmental agency determines the degree of 
cleanup required, the appropriate method for that cleanup may be 
unclear. Environmental agencies often are reluctant to commit them-
selves to accepting anyone remedial method or technology until its 
effectiveness has been demonstrated at a site. 122 An agency may 
allow an owner to attempt a less costly cleanup method upon the 
condition that the owner will have to use a more expensive proven 
method if the initial one is inadequate. 123 
Assuming that an agency or an owner has been able to estimate 
cleanup costs, the question of who is liable for those costs may remain 
115 See Patchin, supra note 104, at 171. 
116 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2) (1988). 
117 Patchin, supra note 104, at 171. 
118 Id. 
119 Id.; see also Kopstein, supra note 68, at 11. 
120 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9621(c), 9622(0(6) (1988). 
121 See David L. Canary, Legal Developments Regarding the Valuation of Contaminated 
Property 9 (1990) (unpublished report, on file with author). 
122 Patchin, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
123 Id. 
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unanswered. Under CERCLA, the EPA or a court can require a 
wide range of parties to pay for cleanup costS. l24 CERCLA section 
107 creates four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs): 
the current owner or operator of a facility; the owner or operator of 
a facility at the time of disposal; any person who arranged for dis-
posal at a facility; and any person who accepted hazardous substances 
for transport to a facility. 125 
A court may hold any of these PRPs strictly liable for cleanup 
costs regardless of fault.126 PRPs, however, can escape CERCLA 
liability if they can fit within one of three narrow defenses. 127 A PRP 
must demonstrate that an act of God, an act of war, or an act or 
omission by a third party with whom the PRP had no contractual 
relationship was the sole cause of contamination. 128 The last of these 
defenses is known as the "third-party" defense. 
In the 1986 amendments to CERCLA, the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),129 Congress extended the 
third-party defense to include innocent landowners who can establish 
both that they acquired their property after the disposal of hazardous 
substances, and that they "did not know and had no reason to know 
that any hazardous substance" was disposed of on their property. 130 
For a landowner to establish that it had no reason to know of the 
contamination, it must have conducted an "appropriate inquiry" into 
the previous ownership and uses of the property prior to the time 
of acquisition. 131 A court will determine whether an owner has under-
taken an appropriate inquiry by considering the owner's specialized 
knowledge or experience, the relationship of the purchase price to 
the market value of the property in an uncontaminated condition, 
commonly known information about the property, and the owner's 
ability to discover contamination by "appropriate inspection". 132 
124 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988). 
126 Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). 
126 See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); see 
Stockford, supra note 22, at 411-12. 
127 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3) (1988). 
128 Id.; see Stockford, supra note 22, at 415-16. 
129 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). 
130 Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i). 
131 Id. § 9601(35)(B). The landowner also must show that it exercised due care with respect 
to the hazardous substance and took reasonable precautions against foreseeable acts or ornis-
sions of the third party who caused the contamination. Id. § 9607(b)(3)(a), (b). 
132 Id. § 9601(35)(B). An owner will be precluded from asserting the third-party defense if 
it has "obtained actual knowledge of the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance 
at such a facility ... and then subsequently transferred ownership of the property to another 
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Many current owners, especially those owners who purchased their 
property before 1986, may not be able to assert this defense if they 
did not conduct the required in-depth examination into their prop-
erty prior to purchasing it. 133 
If a current owner is unable to fit within any of the defenses, then 
a court may hold that owner jointly and severally liable for the entire 
amount of cleanup where the harm on the property is indivisible. 134 
To avoid the imposition of joint and several liability, the owner must 
prove that the harm is divisible, and that there is a reasonable basis 
for apportioning damages. 135 If an owner fails to meet its burden of 
proof and consequently is found jointly and severally liable, it has a 
right to contribution from other PRPs under SARA.l36 This right of 
contribution may be useless, however, if the other PRPs have ceased 
to exist or have become insolvent. 137 In sum, an assessor may be 
unable to determine who will bear the costs of cleanup unless a court 
or the EPA has ordered the PRP to clean up the property, and a 
court has decided the issue of contribution. 
In light of the uncertainties concerning cleanup costs and who is 
liable for those costs, an appraiser or an assessor may find it impos-
sible to quantify accurately the impact of contamination on property 
value. The next section will discuss the varying approaches that 
assessors, taxpayers, courts, and tax boards have taken to acknowl-
edge the costs and uncertainties of owning contaminated property. 
IV. CURRENT ApPROACHES TO VALUING CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 
Three major approaches to the valuation of contaminated property 
have emerged from the case law. l38 At one extreme, local taxing 
authorities have argued that they should be able to ignore the effect 
of contamination on property value. 139 At the other extreme, tax-
payers who own contaminated property have argued that tax asses-
person without disclosing such knowledge" or has caused or contributed to the contamination. 
[d. § 9601(35)(C), (D). 
133 See Stockford, supra note 22, at 424. 
1l!4 See United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810 (S.D. Ohio 1983); 
Stockford, supra note 22, at 418-19. 
136 Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 811; see Stockford, supra note 22, at 419. 
136 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (1988); Elizabeth F. Mason, Comment, Contribution, Contribution 
Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA: Following Laskin's Lead, 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 89-91, 92 (1991). 
137 See Mason, supra note 136, at 96-97. 
138 See Groves, supra note 57, at 2-5. 
139 See infra notes 142-76 and accompanying text. 
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sors should deduct cleanup costs from the market value of the tax-
payers' property.140 In between these two extremes, several courts, 
administrative tax boards, and the Oregon DOR have recognized 
that contamination has some effect on property values. 141 
A. One Extreme: No Reduction in Property Value for 
Contamination 
Several local taxing authorities have refused requests from owners 
of contaminated property for assessment reductions, on the grounds 
that granting such abatements would undermine environmental pol-
icy.142 Courts and tax boards explicitly have rejected these policy 
arguments. 143 For example, in Inmar Associates v. Borough of 
Carlstadt,144 two local taxing authorities, South Bound Brook and 
Carlstadt, argued that they had to disregard the effects of environ-
mental laws on property value. 145 South Bound Brook posited that 
when polluters request tax reductions, environmental policy requires 
a departure from New Jersey's constitutional mandate that all prop-
erty be "assessed according to the same standard of value. "146 In 
New Jersey, that standard is true value. 147 Essentially, South Bound 
Brook argued that the Supreme Court of New Jersey should replace 
the constitutional mandate with a balancing test that weighs the 
environmental policy concerns against true value assessments. 148 In 
rejecting the taxing authority's argument, the court stated that it 
was unable to depart from the constitutional standard of true value 
even for compelling public policy reasons.149 Moreover, the court 
found that federal and state environmental legislation has an impact 
140 See infra notes 179-207 and accompanying text. 
141 See infra notes 210-49 and accompanying text. 
142 E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382,391, 
272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1990); Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 600-01, 
549 A.2d 38, 41 (1988). Environmental policy concerns include protecting public health and 
welfare as well as the environment from the risks posed by hazardous substances. 
142 Firestone, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 391, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 750; ["nmar, 112 N.J. at 600-01, 
549 A.2d at 41; Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 13 (Wash. 
B.T.A. July 12, 1990). The Oregon DOR implicitly rejected environmental policy arguments 
by requiring that all assessments include adjustments reflecting the impact of contamination. 
See OR. ADMIN R. 150-308.205-(E) (1990). 
144 112 N.J. 593, 549 A.2d 38 (1988). 
145 [d. at 600, 549 A.2d at 41. 
146 [d. 
147 [d. at 600-01, 549 A.2d at 40-41. 
148 [d. at 601, 549 A.2d at 41. 
149 [d. 
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on the true value of real property.l50 In short, the I nmar court held 
that an assessor's methodology is patently defective if it does not 
take into account the effect of such legislation. 151 
Similarly, in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. County of Monte-
rey,152 the California Court of Appeals for the Sixth District rejected 
the Monterey County Assessment Appeal Board's finding that 
cleanup costs should not reduce a property's assessed value. l53 The 
board refused to give a reduction to the taxpayer, Firestone, because 
it considered cleanup costs to be costs of doing business and therefore 
costs that Firestone's shareholders should bear. 154 The board further 
reasoned that a tax abatement in effect would transfer some of the 
financial burden of Firestone's legal obligation to clean up its prop-
erty to other taxpayers in the county, thereby violating the policy 
behind pollution control laws. l55 The court of appeals held that the 
board's finding was "erroneous as a matter of law" in light of Cali-
fornia's constitutional requirement that property be assessed at fair 
market value for property tax purposes. 156 
In Firestone, Monterey County offered several arguments in sup-
port of the board's finding and in favor of disregarding the effects of 
cleanup costs on fair market value. 157 The county first contended 
that liability for cleanup belongs to a polluter and does not run with 
the land; therefore, the polluter cannot transfer its liability when 
the property changes ownership.l58 The county next argued that 
cleanup costs could not have been transferred in a hypothetical sale 
of the property because the California Department of Health Ser-
vices (DHS) restricted any transfer of the property until it was 
cleaned Up.159 According to the county, Firestone's appraiser should 
have based his valuation on a hypothetical sale of environmentally 
clean property and not contaminated property.l60 The Firestone 
150 [d. at 600, 549 A.2d at 41; see also Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, 
No. 158325, slip op. at 20 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990) (Massachusetts Appellate Tax 
Board held it could not depart from c;;onstitutional standard of fair cash value by disregarding 
effects on value of environmental regulation and contamination), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 
N.E.2d 959 (1991). 
161 [nmar, 112 N.J. at 609, 549 A.2d at 46. 
162 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 272 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1990). 




167 [d. at 390, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 751. 
168 [d. at 392, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 751. 
169 [d. at 392-93, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 751. 
160 [d. at 393, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 752. 
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court rejected these arguments on the grounds that they did not 
address the issue of whether contamination affects property value. 161 
The court, however, never resolved the valuation issue because it 
found that the taxpayer failed to establish that the assessor should 
have known about the presence of contamination at the time of the 
assessment. 162 
In Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder,163 an assessor made nu-
merous arguments in support of an assessment that ignored the 
impact of contamination on the value of an industrial drum cleaning 
site. 164 The assessor refused to reduce the value of the property even 
though the Washington Department of Ecology had confirmed the 
presence of hazardous wastes there, and environmental experts had 
estimated cleanup costs at between $600,000 and $1.5 million. 165 The 
assessor contended that the contamination had no effect on the value 
of the property for several reasons: cleanup costs do not run with 
the land if there are other PRPs who will be liable for cleanup; 
pollution control, monitoring, and cleanup costs are ordinary busi-
ness expenses that do not run with the land; and the amount of the 
cleanup costs was uncertain. l66 The assessor alternatively argued 
that any reduction to account for cleanup costs would be based on 
pure speculation due to the lack of a cleanup order from an environ-
mental agency at the time of assessment. 167 
The Washington Board of Tax Appeals rejected all of the assessor's 
arguments. l68 Although the board agreed that contributions from 
other PRPs for cleanup costs do relieve an owner of financial re-
sponsibility, it pointed out that the situation in this case was differ-
ent. 169 In Northwest Cooperage, neither the assessor nor the tax-
payer could prove who would be responsible for the cleanup costs. 170 
Because there was a risk that a potential purchaser would have to 
pay for the entire costs of the cleanup, the board found that cleanup 
costs did affect the market value of Northwest Cooperage's prop-
161 Id. at 392-93, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52. The court also rejected Monterey County's 
contentions that Firestone's cleanup costs were not part of the unencumbered fee simple 
estate that assessors value for tax purposes for the same reasons. Id. 
162 Id. at 394, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 752. 
168 Nos. 36278-36280 (Wash. B.T.A. July 12, 1990). 
164 Id. at 8. 
165 Id. at 2, 12. 
166 Id. at 8. 
167 Id. 
166 Id. at 13-15. 
169 Id. at 13-14. 
170 Id. at 14. 
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erty.171 Furthermore, the board held that pollution control, monitor-
ing, and cleanup costs are not ordinary business expenses, but rather 
expenses that run with the land. 172 Any buyer would have to incur 
these expenses regardless of whether it used the property for busi-
ness or personal purposes. 173 
In addition, the board in Northwest Cooperage rejected the asses-
sor's contention that both the cost and certainty of cleanup were 
unknown at the time of assessment. 174 The board stated that under 
Washington's property valuation statute,175 the restrictions that 
CERCLA and Washington's pollution control statute impose on con-
taminated property constitute political restrictions, similar to zoning 
laws, that assessors must take into account.176 Assessors therefore 
must consider the effects of contamination on market value even if 
they cannot quantify that effect precisely. 177 
B. The Other Extreme: Full Reduction in Property Value for 
Contamination 
In contrast to the arguments of local taxing authorities, owners 
of contaminated properties have argued that their properties have 
zero or nominal value for property tax purposes when their costs of 
cleanup exceed the fair market value of similar uncontaminated prop-
erties. 17s These owners have reached their zero or nominal value 
conclusions by either explicitly179 or implicitly1so using a "dollar-for-
dollar reduction" approach-claiming that fair market value should 
be reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis according to the total amount 
of their cleanup costs. The justification for this dollar-for-dollar re-
duction approach is that it reflects the behavior of potential buyers 
in the marketplace. lSI 
171 [d. 
172 [d. at 15. 
173 [d. 
174 [d. at 13. 
176 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.40.030 (West 1991). 
176 Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 13. 
177 [d. 
178 Groves, supra note 57, at 2. 
179 E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 386, 
272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747 (1990); Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 599, 549 
A.2d 38, 40 (1988). 
U!O E.g., Appeal of Great Lakes Container Corp., 126 N.H. 167, 168 (1985); Fjetland v. 
Brown, No. 37533, slip. op. at 3 (Wash. B.T.A. June 5, 1990). 
181 See, e.g., Firestone Tire, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 751 (taxpayer's 
expert testified that purchasers with knowledge of contamination would require deduction 
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For varying reasons, the majority of cases have rejected taxpay-
ers' assertions of zero or nominal value. 182 In Inmar, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the 
putative value of a property for cleanup costs was not a viable 
method to value contaminated property.l83 The court reasoned that 
while cleanup costs might reduce owners' profits, owners should not 
automatically receive reductions in their tax assessments, because 
market value is not necessarily linked to owners' expenses. 184 
Although the Inmar court rejected the dollar-for-dollar reduction 
approach, it did not adopt its own valuation method. l85 Rather, the 
court offered numerous suggestions for the appraisal community's 
consideration. 186 The court's suggestions included, if no market ex-
isted, viewing contaminated properties as special purpose properties 
or considering "value in use" to the owner; and if the property is not 
in use, treating cleanup costs as capital improvements that an owner 
could depreciate over the property's beneficial life. 187 
Applying the Inmar court's suggestion for treating contaminated 
properties as special purpose properties, the Washington Board of 
Tax Appeals rejected a taxpayer's zero value argument. 188 In N orth-
west Cooperage, the board stated that it could treat contaminated 
property as special purpose property by considering both the "value 
in use" and "value in exchange" of such property if necessary. 189 The 
from property value for remediation cost); Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. 
at 5 (taxpayer's expert testified that buyers of contaminated property often discount purchase 
price by expected cost of cleanup). 
182 See, e.g., Inmar, 112 N.J. at 605,549 A.2d at 43-44; Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-
36280, slip op. at 16-18. 
183 Inmar, 112 N.J. at 605, 549 A.2d at 43-44; see also Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. 
Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 17 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990) (Massachu-
setts Appellate Tax Board implied it would not accept dollar-for-dollar reduction in assessed 
value), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381,573 N.E.2d 959 (1991); Murray Pac. Corp. v. Brown, No. 38037, 
slip op. at 10 (Wash. B.T.A. Nov. 9, 1990) (Washington board held that cleanup costs were 
proper reduction in both sales comparison and income capitalization approaches). 
184 Inmar, 112 N.J. at 605,549 A.2d at 43-44. 
185 Id. at 608, 549 A.2d at 45. 
186 Id. at 606-07, 549 A.2d at 44-45. 
187 Id. Value in use or U[u]se value focuses on the contributory value of real estate to the 
enterprise of which it is a part, without regard to its highest and best use or the monetary 
amount that might be realized upon its sale." ApPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, 
at 20. 
188 See Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 16-18 (Wash. 
B.T.A. July 12, 1990); Groves, supra note 57, at 4. 
189 See Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 16-18. Value in exchange or 
exchange value is the monetary value of real property in a typical market. AMERICAN INSTI-
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board reasoned that notwithstanding the customary value in ex-
change standard, certain situations require a measure of flexibility 
in order to determine market value. 190 Using such a flexible ap-
proach, the board found that the taxpayer's property had value to 
its owner or another person as a drum cleaning and recycling plant. 191 
The board concluded therefore that Northwest Cooperage's property 
had greater than nominal value for property tax purposes. 192 
Other courts and tax boards have rejected taxpayers' contentions 
of nominal value when they have found that a property will have a 
future benefit once any contamination is cleaned Up.193 In Appeal of 
Great Lakes Container Corp.194 for example, the New Hampshire 
Board of Tax and Land Appeals found that the property in question 
had "some sale value" despite cleanup costs of $10 million because 
the taxpayer had not forfeited the land to the town for unpaid 
taxes. 195 The board reasoned that the value of the property was its 
future benefit to the taxpayer after pending federal litigation deter-
mined liability for cleanup. 196 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
affirmed the board's conclusion that the taxpayer had failed to meet 
the requisite burden of proof by not providing any evidence of the 
present value of the property's future benefit. 197 
Similarly, in Fjetland v. Brown,198 the Washington Board of Tax 
Appeals rejected a taxpayer's claim that its property had no value. 199 
Although the property was presently unusable and was listed on the 
NPL, the board concluded that the property had present value based 
on its expected future benefits.200 The board reached this conclusion 
by relying both on the identification of PRPs other than the current 
TUTE OF REAL ESTATE ApPRAlSERS, THE DICTIONARY OF REAL ESTATE APPRAlSAL 112 
(1984). 
190 Northwest COOPerrJge, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 17; see also Inmar, 112 N.J. at 606, 
549 A.2d at 44. 
191 Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 18. 
192 Id. 
193 See Groves, supra note 57, at 4. 
194 126 N.H. 167,489 A.2d 134 (1985). 
196 Id. at 169, 489 A.2d at 136 (taxpayer claimed that its property was unsaleable because 
cleanup costs greatly exceeded its maximum market value of$399,200.~taxpayer's purchase 
price in 1976). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 No. 37533 (Wash. B.T.A. June 5, 1990). 
199 Id. at 7. 
310 Id. For an explanation of the board's approach, see infra notes 220-21 and accompanying 
text. 
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owner who would bear most of the cleanup costs, and on the likeli-
hood that a potential purchaser would secure indemnification from 
the owner for any residual liability. 201 
In contrast to the majority position, the Michigan Tax Tribunal 
has upheld taxpayers' claims of nominal property values in three 
separate cases.202 The tribunal accepted the taxpayers' nominal value 
argument with very little analysis of property valuation principles 
and without requiring the taxpayers to prove the impact of the 
contamination on the value of their properties. 203 
For example, in Community Consultants, Inc. v. Bedford Town-
ship,204 the tribunal held that a property-which the state had 
ranked as the second or third most dangerous site in the state in 
light of the presence of hazardous substances there--was of nominal 
value for as long as the contamination was present.205 The tribunal 
reached its conclusion by relying on an assessor's testimony that 
there did not appear to be any market sales of hazardous waste sites 
in Michigan, and that a hypothetical buyer with knowledge of the 
contamination probably would not purchase the property in ques-
tion. 206 The tribunal also considered evidence that the property could 
not be put to any use while it was contaminated, and that the cleanup 
costs exceeded "even the most optimistic value" of a comparable 
uncontaminated property.207 The tribunal used the same approach in 
Comerica Bank-Detroit v. Metamora Township208 and Bielat v. Ma-
comb Township209 to uphold taxpayers' claims on nominal value de-
spite the taxpayers' lack of proof to support such contentions. 
201 Fjetland, No. 37533, slip op. at 7. 
202 Comerica Bank-Detroit v. Metamora Township, Nos. 103325, 110482, 112529, slip op. at 
2 (Mich. Tax Trib. May 12, 1989); Bielat v. Macomb Township, Nos. 93707, 100295, slip op. 
at 2 (Mich. Tax Trib. Oct. 7, 1987); Community Consultants, Inc. v. Bedford Township, No. 
86388, slip op. at 2 (Mich. Tax Trib. July 3, 1985). 
20S See Groves, supra note 57, at 2-3. 
204 No. 86388 (Mich. Tax Trib. July 3, 1985) (abandoned landfill contaminated by previous 
owner who had disposed known and unknown hazardous materials). 
206 [d. at 1, 3. 
206 [d. at 2-3. 
207 [d. at 3. 
208 Nos. 103325, 110482, 112529, slip op. at 12 (Mich. Tax Trib. May 12, 1989). 
209 Nos. 93707, 100295, slip op. at 4-5 (Mich. Tax Trib. Oct. 7, 1987); see also Groves, supra 
note 57, at 3. Taxpayers in both cases basically contended that their properties were worthless 
due to the adverse effects of severe contamination. Comerica Bank-Detroit, Nos. 103325, 
110482. 112529, slip op. at 2, 8-9; Bielat, Nos. 93707, 100295, slip op. at 2. 
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C. The Intermediate Position: Attempts to Measure the Impact of 
Contamination on Property Value 
1. Case Law 
In light of the conflicting case law on the validity of nominal 
valuations, a taxpayer may attempt to measure the impact of con-
tamination on the value of the property. Many cases, however, have 
never reached the substantive issue of how to measure the effect of 
contamination on property value because they typically have found 
that taxpayers have failed to meet their burden of proving that the 
assessor's value was erroneous.210 Unfortunately, the decisions that 
have rejected the taxpayers' valuations are not consistent regarding 
the amount of proof that the taxpayers must present to meet their 
burden. 211 To add to the uncertainty, those cases that have addressed 
the issue of substantive valuation do not reflect a single clear method 
for valuing contaminated property. 212 
An initial problem with the case law is that the amount of evidence 
necessary for a taxpayer to sustain its burden of proof varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some cases have found that taxpayers 
failed to meet their burden of proof even though the taxpayers 
presented substantial evidence. 213 At the same time, other cases 
have sustained taxpayers' claims merely on the basis that the prop-
erties were severely contaminated, and the cleanup costs exceeded 
the value of similar uncontaminated sites.214 Further clouding the 
standard of proof issue, some courts and tax boards have held that 
taxpayers did not sustain their burden of proof, but have offered 
210 See, e.g., Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 20 
(Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990) (taxpayer failed to prove cost of removing contamination 
and effect that cost would have on fair cash value of property), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 
N.E.2d 959 (1991); Appeal of Great Lakes Container Corp., 126 N.H. 167, 169, 489 A.2d 134, 
136 (1985) (taxpayer should have presented evidence of present value of property's future 
benefit in order to meet burden of proof); Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 
593, 609-10, 549 A.2d 38, 46 (1988) (one of two taxpayers appealing did not raise sufficient 
challenge to correctness of assessment). 
211 Compare Reliable Elec., No. 158325, slip op. at 4-11 with Community Consultants, Inc. 
v. Bedford Township, No. 86388, slip op. at 1, 3 (Mich. Tax Trib. July 3, 1985). 
212 See Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278-36280, slip op. at 12-13 (Wash. 
B. T.A. July 12, 1990); Groves, supra note 57, at 8. 
213 See, e.g., Reliable Elec., No. 158325, slip op. at 4-11; Groves, supra note 57, at 5. 
214 See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text; Groves, supra note 57, at 5; see also 
Monroe County Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Miller, 570 A.2d 1386, 1390 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1990) (relying on testimony that property contaminated by benzene was unmarketable, Com-
monwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed lower court's nominal value conclusion). 
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little or no discussion of the specific type of evidence that was lack-
ing.215 
Another problem stems from the Washington Board of Tax Ap-
peals and the Michigan Tax Tribunal developing significantly differ-
ent approaches to valuing contaminated property. The Washington 
Board of Tax Appeals has applied two valuation methods to reflect 
the impact of contamination on property tax assessments.216 The 
board uses a different approach depending on whether a property is 
currently in use or abandoned.217 Rather than adopting either tax-
payers' or assessors' valuations, the board so far has established its 
own assessment in each case.218 
In cases where property has had no present use as a result of its 
contamination, the Washington board has relied on the principle of 
"anticipation".219 In these cases, the board measured the present 
value of a property's expected future benefits by applying a discount 
rate to the future value of the property for the estimated duration 
of the cleanup.22o In arriving at this methodology, the board reasoned 
that while a contaminated property may suffer from diminished 
marketability, it does not follow that the property is valueless.221 
The board stated that a property has value if, at some time in the 
foreseeable future, it will provide benefits. 
The board based its valuation on a value of the property in an 
environmentally clean condition that was mutually agreeable to both 
taxpayer and assessor. It then discounted the expected future value 
of the property, taking into account the effects of inflation and de-
preciation.222 The board used a discount rate that accounted for the 
additional risks associated with ownership of contaminated property, 
215 See, e.g., Appeal of Great Lakes Container Corp., 126 N.H. 167, 169,489 A.2d 134, 136 
(1985). 
216 See Narthwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-,'36280, slip op. at 19-23 (modified income capital-
ization approach); Lefevre v. Vanourk, Nos. 3531~5318, slip op. at 8-9 (Wash. B.T.A. June 
13, 1990) (present value of expected future benefits after cleanup analysis); Fjetland v. Brown, 
No. 37533, slip op. at 7-8 (Wash. B.T.A. June 5, 1990) (present value of expected future 
benefits after cleanup analysis); Canary, supra note 121, at 12-13. 
217 Canary, 8Upra note 121, at 12-13. 
218 Narthwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278-,'36280, slip op. at 21-24; Lefevre, Nos. 35315--35318, 
slip op. at 8-9; Fjetland, No. 37533, slip op. at 7-8. But see Murray Pac. Corp. v. Brown, 
No. 38037, slip op. at 10 (Wash. B.T.A. Nov. 9, 1990) (board found that taxpayer failed to 
meet burden of proof). 
219 "Anticipation" is the perception that value is created by the expectation of benefits to 
be derived in the future. APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 25, at 32. 
220 Lefevre, Nos. 35315-35318, slip op. at 8; Fjetland, No. 37533, slip op. at 8. 
221 Lefevre, Nos. 35315--35318, slip op. at 7; Fjetland, No. 37533, slip op. at 7. 
222 The board assumed that the rate of inflation either was equivalent to the rate of 
depreciation or was zero if the property had no improvement. Lefevre, Nos. 35315--35318, slip 
op. at 8; Fjetland, No. 37533, slip op. at 8; Canary, supra note 121, at 12. 
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such as the costs of stigma and the risk that cleanup might not be 
completed by the estimated cleanup date. 223 
For property that has a present use, the board used the income 
capitalization approach and made adjustments for the presence of 
contamination. The board reasoned that if a property was still in 
use, it had some value for property tax purposes, even if the present 
market might be limited to its current owner.224 In Northwest Coop-
erage, for example, the board estimated the income stream the 
property would have generated if it were uncontaminated. From this 
income stream figure, the board deducted extraordinary expenses 
for pollution monitoring and compliance expenses that a future pur-
chaser would incur.225 The board also increased the capitalization 
rate to reflect the risks associated with owning contaminated prop-
erty, including uncertainties about total cleanup costs, liability to 
third parties, availability of financing, and the impact of stigma on 
future marketability.226 The board then applied the adjusted capital-
ization rate next to the net income stream to determine the prop-
erty's fair market value. 227 
In contrast to the Washington Board of Tax Appeals, the Michigan 
Tax Tribunal has taken a less sophisticated approach to valuing 
contaminated property. In Comerica Bank-Detroit, Bielat v. Ma-
comb Township, and Community Consultants, the tribunal held that 
the value of each of the subject properties was nominal as long as 
contamination was present.228 The tribunal, however, provided little 
analysis or rationale for these conclusions. 229 In fact, the tribunal 
only has referred to the specific valuation method it applied in one 
of the three cases that it has heard on this issue. In Bielat, it found 
that residential properties contaminated by leachate leaking from a 
nearby dumpsite suffered from functional and economic obsoles-
cence.230 Without providing further explanation, the tribunal held 
that the cost approach was the most reliable valuation method in 
this situation. 231 
:123 Lefevre, Nos. 35315-35318, slip op. at 9; Fjetland, No. 37533, slip op. at 8. 
224 Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278-S6280, slip op. at 18 & n.ll (Wash. 
B.T.A. July 12, 1990) (citing Patchin, supra note 6, at 13) (fact that property is unmarketable 
does not necessarily mean it is worthless if present owner uses it). 
226 [d. at 23. 
226 [d. at 19-23. 
227 [d. at 23. 
228 See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text. 
229 Groves, supra note 57, at 2. 
230 Bielat v. Macomb Township, Nos. 93707, 100295, slip op. at 2,4 (Mich. Tax Trib. Oct. 
7, 1987). 
281 [d. at 5. 
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2. The Oregon Rule 
In response to the problems that both taxpayers and local taxing 
authorities were experiencing in this new area of valuation, the 
Oregon DOR issued an administrative rule232 regulating the valua-
tion of contaminated property.233 The DOR attempted to address 
these problems by providing in the rule a clear methodology for 
valuing contaminated property. 
The Oregon rule identifies the types of properties to which it 
applies, and establishes the standards by which taxing authorities 
are to determine the value of those properties. 234 The rule's definition 
of "contaminated site" is limited to real properties on the NPL or 
on the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ's) in-
ventory of confirmed releases, illegal drug manufacturing sites, and 
properties proved to be the location of a hazardous substance re-
lease. 235 
The DOR rule also provides a definition of "cost to cure". The 
term "cost to cure" includes all costs directly related to the cleanup 
of hazardous substances at a site, such as estimated removal, con-
tainment, and treatment costs;236 however, these costs are limited 
to their discounted present value after taxes.237 In addition to 
cleanup costs, the cost to cure may include the cost of "environmental 
audits, surety bonds, insurance, monitoring, and engineering and 
legal fees."238 The DOR defined "cost to cure" because the rule 
requires assessors to account for the cost to cure in their value 
estimates when market data from similarly contaminated properties 
are unavailable. 239 
Under the Oregon rule, an assessor must consider all three tra-
ditional valuation approaches in determining the value of a contam-
inated site: the sales comparison approach, the cost approach, and 
the income capitalization approach.240 Although the rule acknowl-
edges that all three approaches may not be applicable to a given 
site, it requires that assessors examine each one for merit. 241 
232 OR. ADMIN. R. 150-30B.205-(E) (1990). 
233 Canary, supra note 121, at 7 (author was member of task force that drafted Oregon 
rule). 
234 ld.; OR. ADMIN. R. 150-308.205-(E)(I)(a}-(b) (1990). 
236 OR. ADMIN. R. 150-308.205-(E)(I)(a)(A), (B), (C), (D) (1990). 
236 ld. at 150-308.205-(E)(I)(c). 
237 ld. 
238 ld. 
239 ld. at 150-30B.205-(E)(3); Canary, supra note 121, at 8-9. 
240 OR. ADMIN. R. 150-30B.205-(E)(3) (1990). 
241 ld. 
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For the sales comparison approach, the rule states that an assessor 
should use actual market data if such data exist. If there are no 
market data, the assessor may use sales of uncontaminated proper-
ties for comparison and make the necessary adjustments for costs. 
These adjustments include limitations that either the nature and 
extent of the contamination or governmental restrictions have im-
posed on the use of the property, increased costs to insure or finance 
the property, potential liability for the cost to cure, governmentally 
imposed restrictions on transferability of the property, and other 
market influences. 242 
If an assessor applies the cost approach, the assessor first must 
determine the value of the property as if it were clean.243 The as-
sessor then may deduct the cost to cure as a measure of functional 
obsolescence.244 Under the income approach, the rule provides an 
assessor with several options. The rule prefers market rental data, 
but when such data are unavailable, an assessor can use the actual 
income a property generates. 245 The assessor may adjust this income 
stream for the estimated annual cost to cure.246 Moreover, if the 
capitalization rate is derived from uncontaminated properties, the 
assessor should consider adjustments to reflect the risks associated 
with owning contaminated property.247 If, however, the assessor uses 
a capitalization rate from similarly contaminated properties, no ad-
justment is necessary.248 In the alternative, an assessor may estimate 
a property's income stream as if the property were environmentally 
clean and then deduct from that value the cost to cure. 249 
In sum, the Oregon rule provides a useful framework for valuing 
contaminated property by modifying the traditional valuation meth-
ods to account for contamination. This type of framework can elim-
inate many of the uncertainties and inconsistencies that both asses-
sors and taxpayers have encountered in the case law. 
V. A METHOD FOR ENSURING UNIFORM ASSESSMENTS OF 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 
Not all owners of contaminated property can obtain assessments 
that reflect the impact of contamination on their property's value 
242 [d. at 150-308.205-(E)(3)(a)(A)-(E). 
Z43 [d. at 150-308.205-(E)(3)(b). 
244 [d. 
lM6 [d. at 150-308.205-(E)(3)(c). 
246 [d. at 150-308.205-(E)(3)(c)(A). 
1M7 [d. at 150-308.205-(E)(3)(c)(B). 
248 [d. 
1MB [d. at 150-308.205-(E)(3)(c)(C). 
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because some local taxing authorities take contamination into 
account250 while others do not. 251 Even when assessors recognize the 
impact of contamination on property values, the amount by which 
they reduce assessments may vary greatly as a result of uncertainty 
over how to measure that impact.252 Assessments that lack any 
adjustment for the presence of pollution on property may violate 
state constitutional or statutory requirements that all property be 
assessed pursuant to a uniformly applied standard of market value. 253 
To ensure that assessors comply with uniformity requirements, each 
state should enact a specific valuation rule in the form of either a 
statute or an administrative regulation. A rule similar to Oregon's 
administrative regulation would create a valuation methodology that 
is both workable and equitable. 
A. Deficiencies in Current Approaches to Valuing Contaminated 
Property 
1. One Extreme: No Reduction in Property Value for 
Contamination 
If property is contaminated, assessors should not be able to argue 
successfully that no value reduction is warranted to reflect the effects 
of contamination on property value for ad valorem tax purposes. 
Courts and administrative tax boards explicitly have rejected several 
of the assessors' policy and legal arguments supporting their refusals 
to recognize the effects of contamination on property value.254 The 
invalidity of other arguments that assessors have made, however, is 
not so clear. 
The assessing community's fundamental environmental policy ar-
gument is that granting a tax reduction to a taxpayer who is re-
sponsible for cleanup would transfer some of the cleanup cost from 
that culpable polluter to other taxpayers in the form of a reduced 
260 E.g., Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 11-12 
(Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 N.E.2d 959 (1991); Bielat v. 
Macomb Township, Nos. 93707, 100295, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Tax Trib. Oct. 7, 1987). 
251 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 
391-92,272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 751 (1990); Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 
600-01, 549 A.2d 38, 41 (1988); Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 3627!h'l6280, slip 
op. at 8 (Wash. B. T.A. July 12, 1990). 
252 Compare Reliable Elec., No. 158325, slip op. at 11-12 (assessor deducted amortized cost 
to cure from initial income approach estimate to arrive at market value) with Bielat, Nos. 
93707, 100295, slip op. at 3 (assessor cut assessments in half to retIect impact of contamination). 
253 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 149-51, 161-62 and accompanying text. 
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tax base.255 Consequently, tax assessing authorities have argued that 
compliance with federal and state environmental laws compels a 
departure from state requirements that all property be assessed at 
the same percentage of market value.256 Courts and appellate tax 
boards have criticized this argument on the basis that state uniform-
ity requirements do not allow assessors to examine property owners' 
culpability.257 These decisions have reinforced state constitutional 
and statutory mandates that assessors must treat polluters and in-
nocent landowners similarly. 258 
Further, some assessors have argued that giving abatements to 
owners of contaminated property would encourage owners to pollute 
their properties. 259 The reality that any tax savings attributable to 
contamination would be small in comparison to the possible massive 
civil and criminal liabilities illustrates the flaw in this contention. 260 
For example, in one Massachusetts case, an owner's taxes were 
$42,000 in contrast to $6.5 million in cleanup costs and $600,000 in 
civil penalties. 261 Considering the disparity between property taxes 
and the costs of contamination, no rational property owner would 
pollute for such a minimal gain.262 In fact, giving a tax abatement to 
owners of contaminated property may even promote efforts to clean 
up the environment. Owners of contaminated property might be 
more willing to report the presence of contamination if they know 
they can obtain a tax abatement. Assessments therefore should 
reflect the effects of contamination. 
255 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
256 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. If courts allowed assessors to refuse tax 
reductions on the basis of culpability, property assessment would not be equal or uniform. 
Such valuations would violate uniformity requirements because each assessment would depend 
on the particular assessor's ability to ascertain the taxpayer's culpability. Moreover, factors 
determining culpability might be unknown as of the assessment date. 
258 Id. A similar argument is that polluters will be unjustly enriched by their wrongdoing 
if they receive a tax reduction. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. 
App. 3d 382,391,272 Cal. Rptr. 745,750 (1990). Although no court or tax board has addressed 
this argument, either would probably reject it in light of state uniformity requirements. 
259 See, e.g., Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 214 N.J. Super. 256, 266, 518 A.2d 
1110, 1115 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), aff'd, in part, and rev'd, in part, 112 N.J. 593, 
549 A.2d 38 (1988). 
260 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(l) (1988) (civil penalties of up to $25,000 each day for any 
willful violation, failure, or refusal to comply with cleanup orders); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 25189-25191 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991) (fines or criminal penalties for violations). 
261 Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 1-4 (Mass. 
App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990), aff'd, 410 Mass. 381, 573 N.E.2d 959 (1991). 
262 Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae, New Jersey State Bar Association at 12, Inmar 
Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 549 A.2d 38 (1988) (Nos. 26549, 26549). 
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In addition to policy arguments, assessors have offered purely 
legal arguments in support of their decisions to ignore the effects of 
contamination on market value. These arguments also may lack 
merit. For example, assessors have claimed that under certain cir-
cumstances the costs of cleanup are not transferable to a potential 
purchaser, and that therefore no value reduction is appropriate. 263 
According to these assessors, if other PRPs who will contribute to 
the cleanup costs exist, the risk that a buyer will be liable for cleanup 
costs decreases.264 Thus, the assessors argue that in situations in-
volving PRPs other than the current owner, no reduction is neces-
sary because a potential buyer will not have to reduce its offering 
price by the cost of cleanup. 265 
This argument, however, assumes that the identified PRPs will 
remain solvent. If these other PRPs become insolvent, the EPA may 
order a new owner to clean up the property unless the new owner 
can meet the requirements of CERCLA's narrow third-party de-
fense. 266 The buyer who becomes the new owner probably will not 
meet the requirements of the exception given that the assumption 
underlying the assessors' valuation is that a hypothetical sale is at 
arm's-length and with full knowledge of the contamination.267 More-
over, holding such a new owner liable is consistent with CERCLA's 
goal of increasing the pool of responsible parties in order to decrease 
costs to the public.268 Consequently, a likely result under CERCLA 
is that the cost of cleanup would be transferred to a purchaser. 269 
Even if a potential buyer attempts to protect itself by requiring 
an indemnity from the current owner, indemnification will not shield 
the potential buyer from liability in a cleanup action if the seller 
becomes insolvent.27o Potential buyers therefore will make adjust-
ments in their offering prices to reflect the risk that the sellers might 
become insolvent. 
Assessors also argue that where statutes restricting transfer of 
contaminated property are in force, cleanup costs cannot be trans-
268 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 
391, 272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750 (1990); Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278--36280, 
slip op. at 8 (Wash. B. T.A. July 12, 1990). 
264 Northwest Cooperage, Nos. 36278--36280, slip op. at 13-14. 
266 Id. 
266 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988); Note, supra note 63, at 416-18, 421-24. 
267 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i), (B) (1988). 
268 See Note, supra note 63, at 415, 421. 
269 Even assuming liability for cleanup costs is not transferable, assessors still would have 
to make adjustments for other costs of contamination. A potential buyer might make adjust-
ments to the purchase price for the increased costs of financing, market stigma, legal fees for 
defending against property damage and toxic tort lawsuits, and limitations on use. 
270 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(I) (1988); see also Patchin, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
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ferred with the fee simple in a hypothetical sale.271 This argument 
has merit and is probably the assessor's most persuasive argument. 
It nevertheless fails to take into account the fact that ECRA-like 
statutes are governmental restrictions on use of property. Under 
such statutes, the current owner is unable to change its use of the 
property, discontinue its use, or sell the property before incurring 
cleanup costS.272 Any property whose highest and best use273 is so 
restricted inherently is worth less than one not so burdened. Fur-
thermore, many states require assessors to consider the effect of 
governmental restrictions on value. 274 
Finally, assessors have argued that giving a value reduction for 
the presence of contamination would be speculative when cleanup 
costs are uncertain as of the assessment date.275 Although courts 
and administrative tax boards disagree over whether cleanup costs 
must be accurately determined before they can affect property 
value,276 potential buyers will adjust their offering prices to reflect 
the risks associated with known contamination regardless of whether 
future cleanup costs are precisely quantified. As a result, assessors 
should make every effort to account for the costs of contamination 
when valuing contaminated property.277 Nevertheless, it is not un-
reasonable for courts to require that owners seeking tax abatements 
provide some proof of estimated cleanup costs and the effects of 
those costs on value. 278 
2. The Other Extreme: Full Reduction in Property Value for 
Contamination 
Taxpayers' use of the dollar-for-dollar reduction approach, often 
resulting in nominal valuations, also may fail to reflect accurately 
2'11 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
2'12 See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. 
2'13 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. 
2'14 See supra note 2:1. 
2'16 See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text. 
2'16 On one hand, the Inmar and Northwest Cooperage decisions held that assessors had to 
attempt to quantify the impact of contamination on value once the presence of contamination 
was confirmed. Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 609, 549 A.2d 38, 46 
(1988); Northwest Cooperage Co. v. Ridder, Nos. 36278--36280, slip op. at 13 (Wash. B. T.A. 
July 12, 1990). On the other hand, the Reliable Electronic board refused to grant a tax 
abatement on the grounds that the taxpayer did not adequately prove either the costs of 
cleanup--even though the taxpayer estimated cleanup costs of $6.5 million based on engi-
neering studies-or the effects of those costs on market value. Reliable Elec. Finishing Co. 
v. Board of Assessors, No. 158325, slip op. at 4,20 (Mass. App. Tax Bd. Aug. 9, 1990), aff'd, 
410 Mass. 381, 573 N.E.2d 959 (1991). 
2'17 See Groves, supra note 57, at 9. 
2'13 Id. 
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the effects of contamination on property value. The Inmar court 
rejected a taxpayer's dollar-for-dollar reduction argument on the 
grounds that the $450,000 cost of its cleanup contract was not con-
clusive on the question of value. 279 The court's criticism of Inmar's 
argument may be accurate because, under ECRA, Inmar could not 
have transferred its liability for cleanup to a potential buyer in a 
hypothetical sale.280 As discussed above, cleanup costs arguably may 
not be transferable if an ECRA-like statute is in place.281 
Further, the dollar-for-dollar reduction approach may underesti-
mate or overestimate the actual decrease in property value in a 
given situation. If a taxpayer incurs the total amount of cleanup 
costs in the tax year in question, then a dollar-for-dollar reduction 
may be appropriate. If, however, a taxpayer incurs cleanup costs 
over the course of more than one year, then a deduction for the total 
cleanup costs in the first year would give the taxpayer a windfall. 
The dollar-for-dollar reduction for total cleanup costs is inappropriate 
in the latter situation because of the time value of money.282 For 
example, the value of $450,000 spent over five years is less than 
$450,000 spent today because interest will accrue during the five-
year period. A better approach thus is the one the Oregon rule 
requires: taking the discounted present value of $450,000.283 While 
potentially overestimating the loss in property value attributable to 
contamination, the dollar-for-dollar approach also may underesti-
mate this loss because it ignores the other costs and uncertainties 
associated with contamination. 284 
279 Inmar, 112 N.J. at 605,549 A.2d at 43. 
280 The Inmar facts, however, were not ideal for testing the validity of the dollar-for-dollar 
reduction approach because, as the New Jersey Tax Court found, Inmar's contract obligation 
was not fixed as of the assessment date. Id. at 599, 549 A.2d at 40-41. Moreover, ECRA was 
not yet effective. See supra note 273. 
281 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
282 MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 352 (1988). 
283 OR. ADMIN. R. 150-30B.205-(F)(I)(c) (1990). The Inmar court suggested another possible 
approach: treating cleanup costs as a capital improvement that could be depreciated over the 
beneficial life of the property. 112 N.J. at 609, 549 A.2d at 45. This approach would be valid 
only if the taxpayer incurred a fixed obligation, as opposed to mere potential liability for 
cleanup, in the year in question. Furthermore, it may not be appropriate to apply this income 
tax concept in the property tax context. 
284 See supra notes 59-137 and accompanying text. 
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3. The Intermediate Position: Attempts to Measure the Impact of 
Contamination on Property Value 
a. Case Law 
The practice of establishing a valuation method for contaminated 
property on a case-by-case basis has many deficiencies. The most 
troublesome aspect of the case law is that neither taxpayers nor 
assessors can predict with any certainty how a court or administra-
tive tax board will respond to their valuations. This is especially 
true if there is no precedent-setting case in their jurisdiction. This 
uncertainty results from the lack of a consistent methodology for 
valuing contaminated property and the wide variance among juris-
dictions in the amount of proof required to sustain an assessment 
appeal.285 A consensus on how to value contaminated property has 
not developed yet primarily because this issue is relatively new for 
assessors, appraisers, tax boards, and courts. 286 
In addition, lack of certainty in the case law often leads to in-
creased transactional costs. Without any reliable rules to evaluate 
the accuracy of their assessments, taxpayers appeal these assess-
ments. Such unnecessary appeals waste scarce judicial resources and 
cost taxpayers money that could be used for cleanup. A final problem 
with relying on case law is that using adjudication to develop a 
coherent approach to valuing contaminated property will be a slow 
process. Courts cannot address each relevant issue until owners of 
contaminated property raise it on appeal. Few taxpayers, however, 
will be able to appeal their assessments in the face of legal, appraisal, 
and engineering fees that well may exceed any reduction in their 
taxes. The case law thus never may address all of the factors that 
assessors and appraisers consider necessary to accurate property 
valuation. 
b. Oregon Rule 
To avoid drawbacks of case-by-case development of rules for val-
uing contaminated property, each state simply could adopt the Or-
285 See 8'U/Pro notes 212-30 and accompanying text. 
288 Patchin, supra note 6, at 9 ("[t]he development of techniques for valuing contaminated 
property is still in its infancy"). The case law also may not have reached a consensus as a 
result of the difficulty in obtaining relevant opinions. Some of the decisions addressing val-
uation of contaminated property did not consider existing case law. For example, none of the 
parties involved in the Fire8tone case, including the court, ever discussed the only appellate 
decision of any consequence on this issue, InrruJ,T. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County 
of Monterey, 223 Cal. App. 3d 382, 272 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1990). 
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egon rule. A wholesale adoption of the Oregon rule, however, might 
not be the best solution. The rule, as the first attempt by any state 
agency to enact this type of rule, has several flaws that any state 
seeking to adopt it should address. First, the Oregon DOR unneces-
sarily restricted its definitions of "contaminated site" and "cost to 
cure". In the rule's definition of "contaminated site", the DOR chose 
to include only one of the three DEQ lists of contaminated property-
DEQ's inventory of confirmed releases-even though placement on 
any DEQ list would have a negative effect upon a property's value. 287 
Further, the DOR narrowed its definition of "cost to cure" to the 
after tax cost of a cleanup to the taxpayer that undertook it. The 
DOR in effect is requiring assessors to focus on the tax status of 
specific property owners rather than on the fair market value of 
their property.288 Such a restriction on the cost to cure is inappro-
priate because any potential buyer will incur the cleanup costs re-
gardless of whether it is a corporation conducting a business on the 
property or an individual using the property for nonbusiness pur-
poses. Both of these limitations appear to be policy choices that do 
not conform with traditional valuation principles. 
In addition, the Oregon DOR did not address the types of adjust-
ments that assessors need to make to the sales comparison and 
income capitalization approaches to account for the effects of market 
stigma and potential liability to third parties.289 The DOR may have 
excluded these two factors because the impact of these costs is 
somewhat unclear to the appraisal community. With regard to the 
cost approach, the rule does not specify whether an assessor may 
deduct the cost to cure, as a form of functional obsolescence, from 
either the value of both the improvements and the land in a clean 
condition or the value of the improvements alone. This distinction is 
important because functional obsolescence traditionally applies only 
to defects in the structures on the land. Thus, adapting functional 
obsolescence to the impairment of land use may be improper. 290 
Finally, with regard to the income approach, the DOR failed to 
specify which capitalization rate assessors should apply when they 
use the alternative technique of estimating a property's income 
stream as if it were uncontaminated and then deducting the cost to 
cure from that value. 291 
2B7 Canary, supra note 121, at 8. 
288 Id. at 9. 
289 Id. 
290 Inmar Assocs. v. Borough of Carlstadt, 112 N.J. 593, 608, 549 A.2d 38,45 (1988). 
291 Canary, supra note 121, at 10. 
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B. A Proposed Rule for Valuating Contaminated Property 
In light of the inherent deficiencies of developing rules for valuing 
contaminated property on a case-by-case basis, each state should 
promulgate its own statute or administrative rule, similar to the 
Oregon rule, to ensure that assessors will value contaminated prop-
erty in conformity with the state's uniformity requirements. Such 
rules should require assessors to recognize the negative impact of 
contamination on market value regardless of an owner's culpability 
for the pollution, as well as establish a specific methodology for 
measuring that impact. 
In order to develop a comprehensive and workable rule, each state 
should create a task force composed of appraisers, assessors, attor-
neys, taxpayers, and state environmental and tax officials.292 The 
task force then, in a relatively short period of time, could draft a 
rule that addresses all the relevant factors necessary to valuing 
contaminated property. 293 
To ensure certainty and uniformity in the valuation of contami-
nated property, the statute or rule should be a mandatory require-
ment rather than a discretionary guideline. 294 The form of the rule 
will depend on whether a state already has a comprehensive valua-
tion statute or administrative regulation in place. If a state has a 
valuation statute, then the state legislature can amend that statute 
to include requirements regarding the valuation of contaminated 
property. On the other hand, if the state has an administrative body, 
such as the Oregon DOR, that regulates property tax assessments, 
then an amendment to the body's administrative rules might be more 
appropriate. 
A viable rule for valuating contaminated property must inform 
assessors and municipalities that they cannot carry out environmen-
tal policy goals through the tax assessment machinery in violation 
of state uniformity requirements. Assessors thus no longer would 
disregard the effects of contamination on a culpable owner's prop-
erty. Instead, they would have to treat both culpable and innocent 
landowners the same under state property tax laws. 
Beyond requiring that assessments account for the impact of con-
tamination on property value, the rule should establish a valuation 
methodology for measuring that impact. Specific provisions of the 
292 The Task Force for the Valuation of Contaminated Property in Oregon included repre-
sentatives from each of these groups. [d. at 7. 
293 The task force drafted the Oregon rule in six months. [d. 
2N See id. at 8. 
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rule may vary from state to state because the environmental laws 
and taxation standards of each state differ. Nevertheless, all rules 
should have some of the same basic provisions. 
A state's rule first should contain definitions of the terms "contam-
inated site" and "cost to cure", as does the Oregon rule. The defi-
nition of "contaminated site" should include real property that is on 
any federal or state list of contaminated sites,295 and whose value is 
adversely affected by virtue of being on that list. In addition, the 
definition should include sites where an owner can prove that there 
has been a release of a hazardous substance on its property. The 
definition of "contaminated site", however, should exclude sites 
where the contamination is limited to structures containing asbes-
toS.296 
A definition of "cost to cure" also is necessary because assessors 
will consider these costs when they apply the three appraisal meth-
ods. The definition should enumerate the types of costs covered in 
the rule as well as describe how to measure those costs. Cost to cure 
should include all costs directly related to remediation of hazardous 
substances297 but be limited to the discounted present value of the 
remaining estimated amount of cleanup. Using the discounted pres-
ent value prevents a taxpayer from using the dollar-for-dollar re-
duction approach that the Inmar court rejected except when the 
taxpayer incurs all its cleanup costs in a single year. 298 
A state's contaminated property valuation rule only should require 
an estimate of cost to cure. By extending the definition of "cost to 
cure" to include both final and estimated costs, the rule will provide 
for the possibility that costs may increase in the future as environ-
mental standards change.299 Assessors thus will have to consider the 
effects of contamination regardless of their inability to quantify those 
effects with precision. 3°O The rule also should set forth the type of 
proof necessary to support an estimate of cost to cure.301 It should 
require property owners to offer objective evidence of cleanup costs, 
295 For example, one could expect that a listing on the NPL, CERCLIS, or a state equivalent 
would adversely affect the value of properties appearing on any of those lists. 
296 See supra note 1. The DOR decided to establish a separate rule for structures containing 
asbestos despite the task force's recommendation to include these sites. Canary, supra note 
121, at 8. 
297 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 142-76 and accompanying text. 
301 See Canary, supra note 121, at 9. 
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such as opinions of expert witnesses, environmental reports, and 
engineering studies. 302 
After defining "cost to cure", a state's rule should adopt the DOR's 
method of separately incorporating the effects of contamination into 
the sales comparison approach, the cost approach, and the income 
approach. States will need to address specific issues when adapting 
these three approaches to the valuation of contaminated properties. 
For example, with regard to the sales comparison approach, a state 
will need to decide whether to allow adjustments for market stigma 
and potential liability to third parties. Additionally, if the state has 
an ECRA-like statute, it must decide whether an adjustment for 
that type of governmental restriction is appropriate. With regard to 
the cost approach, the state may want to consider restricting the 
deduction for cost to cure, as a form of functional obsolescence, to 
defects in the structures on land. In fact, the cost approach may be 
better suited for a separate rule on the valuation of buildings con-
taining asbestos. Finally, for the income approach, the state should 
require both an adjustment to the income stream to reflect the cost 
to cure and a capitalization rate that reflects the increased risks 
associated with owning contaminated property.303 The state must 
make clear which capitalization rate assessors should apply when 
they are using either an income stream that initially accounts for 
contamination or one that does not. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Contaminated property is worth less than similar environmentally 
clean property because the costs and uncertainties involved in com-
plying with federal and state environmental laws adversely affect 
the fair market value of contaminated property. All property tax 
assessments should reflect the decline in market value due to the 
presence of hazardous substances regardless of the owners' CUlpa-
bility. Most tax assessments, however, do not account for contami-
nation because assessors either refuse to recognize the impact of 
contamination on property value or do not know how to measure 
that impact. The case law only adds a further layer of confusion to 
the problem of valuing contaminated property. 
Even though courts and administrative tax boards have acknowl-
edged that contamination affects property value, they have been 
302 See id. 
303 See Canary, supra note 121, at 9-10. 
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unable to develop a coherent methodology for measuring the impact 
of contamination on value. Therefore, to ensure uniform tax assess-
ments and minimize uncertainty, each state should enact a statute 
or administrative rule, similar to the Oregon DOR's rule, that sets 
forth a specific methodology for valuing contaminated property. 
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APPENDIX 
1990 OREGON ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULE 150-308.205-(E) 
Valuation of Contaminated Property 
(1) DEFINITIONS: 
925 
(a) "Contaminated site" means real property that, on the assess-
ment date: 
(A) Is on the National Priority List of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency; 
(B) Is included by the Department of Environmental Quality in 
an inventory of confirmed releases pursuant to ORS 465.225; 
(C) Is an illegal drug manufacturing site as defined in ORS 453.858; 
or 
(D) Is demonstrated as provided under Section (2) of this rule to 
have had a release of a hazardous substance as defined in ORS 
466.540. 
(b) "Contaminated site" does not include any permitted release or 
permitted facility approved by the Department of Environmental 
Quality for storage or disposal of a hazardous substance. 
(c) "Cost to cure" means the discounted present value of the 
estimated after tax cost of the remaining remedial work specific to 
the subject property to remove, contain, or treat the hazardous 
substance. Cost to cure may include the cost of environmental audits, 
surety bonds, insurance, monitoring costs, and engineering and legal 
fees. The costs must be directly related to the clean up or contain-
ment of a hazardous substance. 
(2) DEMONSTRATING CONTAMINATION OF SITE: 
A property is defined as a contaminated site under Section 
(1)(a)(D) above if it is shown that: 
(a) The property has had a release of a hazardous substance. This 
will be demonstrated through the submission of reliable, objective 
information such as engineering studies, environmental audits, lab-
oratory reports or historical records; and 
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(b) The release has been reported to the Department of Environ-
mental Quality. 
(3) APPRAISING CONTAMINATED SITES: 
The true cash value of a contaminated site shall be determined in 
accord with this rule. The appraiser shall consider the Sales Com-
parison Approach, the Cost Approach, and the Income Approach. 
For a particular contaminated site, it may be that all three ap-
proaches cannot be applied, however, each shall be investigated for 
its merit. In all cases, actual market data are the most reliable 
indicators. 
(a) The Sales Comparison Approach may be used to determine the 
true cash value of a contaminated site by comparison with verified 
sales of similarly contaminated sites. If no sales exist of property 
similarly contaminated, a comparison may be made to sales of the 
properties without contamination. Adjustment factors shall be de-
veloped to account for the influence of contamination based upon a 
cost to cure analysis. These factors shall be applied to the subject 
property. 
Adjustments shall be considered for the following: 
(A) Limitations upon the use of the contaminated site due to the 
nature and extent of the contamination or due to governmental 
restrictions related to contamination; 
(B) The increased cost to insure or finance the property; 
(C) The potential liability for the cost to cure; 
(D) Governmental limitations and restrictions placed upon the 
transferability of all or any portion of the contaminated sites; 
(E) Other market influences. 
(b) The Cost Approach may be used to determine the value of the 
contaminated site without the contamination. The cost to cure may 
be deducted as a measure of functional obsolescence. 
(c) The Income Approach should use market rental data. Ifmarket 
rental data are not available, the property's actual income may be 
used. 
(A) The income stream may be adjusted to reflect the estimated 
annual cost of remedial work specific to the subject property to 
remove, contain, or treat the hazardous substance during those years 
the cost is incurred. The annual cost of remedial work may include 
the cost of environmental audits, surety bonds, insurance, monitor-
ing costs, and engineering and legal fees. The costs must be directly 
related to the clean up or containment of a hazardous substance. 
(B) If the capitalization rate is derived from properties with similar 
contamination, no adjustment should be made to that rate. If the 
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rate is developed from properties without contamination, or a built-
up rate is used, consider adjustments for the increased present and 
contingent future risk of ownership, difficulties in future appreciation 
or depreciation, and the effect upon the ability to sell or transfer the 
property; that is, the liquidity of an investment in the property. 
(C) Alternately, an income approach projecting the income stream 
as if the subject property was not contaminated, may be used when 
the cost to cure is deducted from the resultant value indicator. 
(d) The market may respond to contamination in a variety of ways. 
In all cases, actual market sales and income data are the most reliable 
indicators. 
Hist: Filed 9/20/89 and Eff. 12131189 
